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Abstract
We study how competition from privately supplied currency substitutes
aﬀects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is ineﬃciently provided,
inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper
bound on equilibrium inﬂation rates. Furthermore, if “inside monies” can
be produced at a suﬃciently low cost, outside money is driven out of circu-
lation. Whenever a ’benevolent’ government can commit to its ﬁscal policy,
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21. Introduction
Payment systems have gone through a major transformation in the last two
decades. In particular, electronic payments have risen in most developed countries
and are expected to rise even more in the future.1 The development of the technol-
ogy to transfer information electronically has increased substitutability between
deposits and currency in transactions and has substantially reduced the cost of
transactions using deposits.2 Deposits used for electronic payments3 are highly
substitutable for currency because the settling value is ultimately a liability of
the ﬁnancial institution that issues the electronic card (checks, in contrast, are
a liability of the purchaser). Clearing electronic transactions is also considerably
less expensive than clearing checks (1/3 to 1/2 of the cost of checks, according to
Humphrey et al, 1996). Furthermore, in contrast to currency, deposits used for
electronic transactions can pay nominal interest on the average balance at a very
low cost.
In spite of the technological developments leading to a widespread use of dif-
ferent forms of electronic money, there has been little theoretical attention on a
range of issues raised by this. How is monetary policy aﬀected by the increased
competition from inside money? Does the increased eﬃciency in the supply of
inside money induce lower inﬂation rates? Can the increasing eﬃciency in the
supply of inside money result in a cashless economy? In other words, will inside
money drive outside money out? In this paper we investigate the theoretical issues
associated with competition between currency and currency substitutes, between
outside and inside money.
At ﬁrst glance, competition between suppliers of currency substitutes and be-
tween them and the monopolist supplier of currency should induce a lower price
for the use of money and, therefore, lower inﬂation rates as well as nominal interest
rates. However, one reason for high inﬂation rates, emphasized in the literature,
is the time inconsistency of monetary policy; and it is unclear whether expos-
1For example, Humphrey et al.( 1996) ﬁnd that “in all (fourteen) developed countries but
the United States, electronic payments have been either the sole or the primary reason for the
34 percent rise in total non-cash payments between 1987 and 1993”( p. 935).
2A c c o r d i n gt oH u m p h r e ye ta l .(2003), there has been a major reduction in the operating
costs of providing bank payments and other services, associated with the development of elec-
tronic payments. They estimate those costs to have fallen by 24% relative to banks’ total assets
in 12 European countries over 1987-1999.
3We call these deposits used for electronic payments, electronic money, which are privately
issued currency substitutes, a form of inside money.
3ing monetary authorities to competition will discipline them or possibly worsen
the time consistency problem. In other words, the role of competition cannot be
analyzed independently of the commitment problem. The aim of this paper is
to study these issues in the context of a dynamic monetary general equilibrium
model where currency is the unique outside money and where competitively sup-
plied inside monies are perfect substitutes for currency. To this end, we consider
monetary regimes that diﬀer in two dimensions regarding the monetary authority:
the objective function (whether the aim is to maximize transfers or welfare) and
the ability to commit to a policy (whether there is full commitment or policies
are sequentially redesigned).
We start the analysis in Section 2 by describing the competitive equilibria for
given monetary policies. In Section 3, we show that a government that maximizes
transfers (or revenues) and is able to commit to its policies will be induced by
competition from currency substitutes to set a low stationary inﬂation rate. This
inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sd r i v e nd o w nw i t ht h er e d u c t i o no fﬁnancial intermediation costs,
and approaches a negative number, corresponding to the Friedman rule, as the in-
termediation costs approach zero. Since these low inﬂation equilibrium outcomes
are time inconsistent we analyze, in Section 4, the set of sustainable equilibria,
in particular, whether the commitment solution can be sustained through reputa-
tion, and how competition from currency substitutes aﬀects the set of sustainable
equilibria. We show that the set of sustainable equilibria with valued currency
is characterized by inﬂation rates which are nonnegative and are bounded above.
The zero lower bound results from the need of future positive rents for the reputa-
tion mechanism to work. The upper bound results from inside money competition
since it limits the expected revenues that can be obtained from outside money.
When the production of inside money is suﬃciently eﬃcient the corresponding
upper bound would become negative and, as a result, there is no equilibrium with
valued currency.
Competition between outside and inside money is an interplay between two
sources of ineﬃciency, one resulting from lack of commitment aﬀecting the sup-
ply of outside money and the other an assumed technological inferiority in the
supply of inside money. Outside money is produced at zero cost but, without
commitment, requires inﬂationary rents to exist in equilibrium. Inside money is
produced competitively but at a positive cost. In equilibrium, whether inside
or outside money circulates is determined by which of the two sources of ineﬃ-
ciency is dominant. In summary, inside money competition enhances eﬃciency
by constraining the inﬂation rates that can be sustained in equilibria with valued
4currency. However, as the intermediation costs are reduced, outside money may
be driven out of circulation. In this case, because the economy would be using a
more costly technology to supply money, there would be a welfare loss.
In Section 5 we analyze the case of a “representative” government. With
full commitment, the Ramsey planner chooses to implement the Friedman rule.
Therefore, with commitment, there is no disciplinary role for competition from
currency substitutes. However, even if the monetary authority can not commit to
future decisions, as long as the ﬁscal authority is committed to an expenditure
and tax policy, it is a time-consistent monetary policy to maintain the Friedman
rule. This is due to the fact that, once there is commitment to ﬁscal policy, the
zero bound on interest rates leaves no room for enhancing welfare by changing
the time pattern of government revenues. It follows that in this regime, inside
money competition plays no role independently of whether there is commitment
to monetary policy. Only the ’technologically eﬃcient’ outside money circulates.
In our model we abstract from some aspects that distinguish diﬀerent “cur-
rency substitutes”. Deposits can be used for transactions through electronic pay-
ments in many diﬀerent ways. Our model allows for the use of deposits for trans-
actions through an arrangement that most resembles debit cards, which allow
buyers to make purchases directly using funds from some form of deposit account.
Reloadable cash cards would also ﬁt our description of currency substitutes, but
these cards are not widely used and do not typically pay interest, although they
could.
In our set up, currency substitutes are assumed to be fully backed, default free
deposits that are perfect substitutes for currency. The suppliers of these deposits
are price takers. Relaxing these assumptions can signiﬁcantly alter the results. If
the suppliers of currency substitutes can default on nominal contracts, then they
will, unless the resulting loss of future proﬁts prevents them from doing so. If the
suppliers of inside monies were not price takers, then they would have an incentive
to overissue in order to devalue outstanding balances. In Marimon, Nicolini and
Teles (2000), we analyze a monetary arrangement of that type as an example of
how the reputation and the competition mechanisms interact.
That alternative environment is also analyzed in Klein (1974), with ”...one
dominant money (currency supplied by a government monopoly) and many pri-
vately produced nondominant monies (deposits supplied by diﬀerent commercial
banks).” Klein asked most of the questions that we address in this paper. In
particular, he made it clear that competition between the private issuers of cur-
rency substitutes and between them and the monopolist issuer of currency did
5not dismiss and could even raise intertemporal consistency problems. However,
he did not provide a full characterization of the equilibrium set as we do in this
paper. To our knowledge, Taub (1985) has been the only previous attempt to
study “currency competition” taking into account reputational aspects using a
dynamic general equilibrium framework.4
2. Competitive monetary equilibria
In this section we describe the economic environment and characterize its mone-
tary equilibria for a given policy. The economy is populated by a large number of
identical inﬁnitely lived households, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and a government.
The households have preferences deﬁned over consumption of a cash good, c1
t,
consumption of a credit good, c2









t) − αnt]. (2.1)
Assuming that leisure enters linearly into the utility function is in no way essential,
but signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the analysis. The function u is increasing, strictly
concave, and diﬀerentiable.
The households are endowed with a unit of time that can be used for leisure or
total labor, nt, which can be allocated to the production of the consumption good
or the production of deposits, ne
t. The production technology of the consumption





t = nt − n
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We use the timing of transactions as found in Svensson (1985). The goods
market meets in the beginning of the period. The cash good, c1
t, must be purchased
using either currency, Mt, or privately issued currency substitutes, Et, which have
been carried over from the previous period. Currency substitutes are deposits that
the buyers can easily access, for example using electronic cards. The credit good,
wages, and government transfers are paid at the end of the period in the assets
market where the households can adjust their portfolios of currency, deposits,
and real bonds. In principle, currency and currency substitutes do not have
4In contrast with this paper, Taub (1985) only considers time-consistent stationary policies
and therefore cannot provide a full characterization of equilibria with reputation and competi-
tion.
6to be traded at par. In other words, there are two nominal units of account
corresponding to the two payment systems. Goods are priced in units of these
two assets; that is, Pm
t is the price of goods in currency and Pe
t the corresponding
price in privately issued currency substitutes. The corresponding exchange rate in
period t is εt = Pm
t /P e
t , which denotes the price of deposits in units of currency.
We focus our attention on three types of equilibria. In the ﬁrst type of equilibria,
both currency and deposits are valued, meaning that if the supply was positive and
ﬁnite, the price would be ﬁnite. Because of perfect substitutability the exchange
rate is indeterminate. We look at equilibria where the two monies trade at par,
εt =1 , and where the supply and demand of deposits is zero, Et =0 , t ≥ 0.I n
the second type of equilibria, currency is never valued. Only deposits are used for
transactions. If Mt > 0,t h e nεt = ∞. Finally, we also consider a third type of
equilibria where deposits have zero value, but currency is valued. In this case, if
Et > 0,t h e nεt =0 . There are no equilibria where both monies have zero value.
We use Pt to denote the price of goods in the relevant unit of account. Thus, when
currency is valued, including the case in which deposits are also valued, εt =1 ,
t ≥ 0,t h e nPt = P m
t , and when only inside money circulates, then Pt = Pe
t .5
The representative household is endowed with initial holdings of money M0 and
of real bonds valued at R0bh
0, as well as initial deposits that are assumed to be zero,
I
f
0E0 =0 . W ea s s u m ef o rc o n v e n i e n c et h a tR0 = β
−1. The household chooses
sequences of consumptions and labor {c1
t,c 2





















t+1 is the gross interest on deposits held from period t to t+1in units of deposits.
If both outside and inside money are valued forever, i.e., εt =1 ,t≥ 0,t h e














t ≤ Mt + Et (2.3)
and a no-Ponzi scheme condition that guarantees that the present value budget is
5In our environment with a dominant money (currency) and privately issued deposits, it
would be natural to assume a one-sided convertibility legal requirement in that deposits are
convertible on demand into currency at a one-to-one ﬁxed exchange rate. This convertibility
requirement implies that, in equilibrium, εt ≥ 1.I fεt < 1, depositors would exercise their option
to convert their deposits at par value.
7satisﬁed.6 Notice that there is no nominal interest paid on currency, while deposits
Et+1 are remunerated by ﬁnancial intermediaries at the gross nominal interest rate,
I
f
t+1. The nominal interest rate on bonds is given by It+1 ≡
Pt+1
Pt Rt+1.
Since currency does not pay nominal interest, in the equilibria where both
currency and deposits are valued, and εt =1 ,t≥ 0,i tm u s tb et h a tI
f
t+1 =1 ,











In an equilibrium where currency is never valued and where only deposits are







meaning that the cost of holding inside money is the diﬀerence between the return
on bonds and the return on deposits. To simplify notation, from now on we use
the fact that in equilibrium the real rate of return on bonds always satisﬁes (2.6).
Private issuers of inside money The ﬁnancial intermediation sector is com-
petitive. A representative issuer of inside money oﬀers deposits Et+1 at a gross in-
terest rate I
f
t+1. We assume that their contracts are enforceable, possibly through
banking regulation. The ﬁnancial intermediation technology is such that they
must pay a real cost, in units of labor, for the supply of deposits, at redemption
time, as a fraction of the real value of the outstanding deposits: ne
t = θEt
Pt.T h e
ﬁnancial intermediary holds the total amount deposited, Et+1,a sb o n d s ,Ptbe
t+1,
which pay gross interest It+1.T h ec a s hﬂow of the ﬁnancial intermediary in period
t ≥ 0 is










6If inside money is not valued, i.e., εt =0 ,t ≥ 0,E t must be replaced by εtEt in the
constraints and, similarly, if currency is not valued, i.e., εt = ∞,t≥ 0,M t must be replaced by
Mt/εt.
8Free entry in the ﬁnancial intermediation sector results in Πt+1 =0 , t ≥ 0,w h i c h ,
given that Et+1 = Ptbe
t+1 and Ptne
t = Etθ, implies
It+1 − I
f
t+1 = θ, t ≥ 0 (2.8)
Recall that we assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries are price takers and honor
their liabilities. If they were not price takers, then it would be optimal to surprise
the households and overissue. This overissuing would have an impact on the price
level and would reduce the real value of the nominal liabilities of the ﬁnancial
intermediary. Similarly, if the deposit contracts could not be enforced then they
w o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n t i v e ,i na n yg i v e np e r i o d ,t od e f a u l to nd e p o s i t s . 7
Government Given (M0,R 0d0), a government policy consists of a sequence of
transfers {gt}
∞
t=0, that can be negative, and a monetary and debt policy {Mt+1,d t+1}∞
t=0.
For now, we abstract from sources of revenues other than seigniorage; therefore,
in the equilibria where both currency and deposits are valued, the intertemporal
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n to ft h eg o v e r n m e n ti s
Mt+1 + Ptdt+1 ≥ Mt + PtRtdt + Ptgt (2.9)
together with a no-Ponzi games condition.
In setting its policy, the government takes into account the competitive be-













where It+1 = β
−1 Pt+1
Pt and m(I) is deﬁned implicitly by (2.4) together with the
cash-in-advance constraint, i.e., m(I)=u0−1(αI). In the equilibria where currency




tgt ≤− R0d0 (2.11)
It is well known, that, in general, for a given money supply policy {Mt+1}∞
t=0
there are multiple competitive equilibria, with diﬀerent paths for the initial price
7Marimon, Nicolini and Teles (1999) study the case of private issuers of currency who are
neither price takers nor necessarily credible.
9level and interest rates (P0,{It+1}∞
t=0). We will focus our attention on equilibria
with constant rates of money growth, from period t =1on. In this case, in
addition to stationary equilibria there may be multiple non stationary equilibria.










ﬁed government policy {Mt+1,d t+1,g t}∞
t=0, a competitive equilibrium where inside
and outside money are valued (i.e. εt =1 ,t≥ 0)8 consists of sequences of price lev-





















t=0, such that households
maximize their utility subject to their budget constraints, ﬁnancial intermediaries









Equilibria with valued currency As previously mentioned, we are interested
in the characterization of stationary equilibria (from period one on) where one or
both forms of monies are valued. In equilibria where currency is held, the cost of




must hold. Since the cost of holding deposits is It+1 − I
f
t+1 = θ,i nas t a t i o n a r y
equilibrium with valued currency it must be that either It+1 = I<1+θ, t ≥ 0 or
It+1 =1+θ, t ≥ 0. In equilibria with I<1+θ, t ≥ 0, deposits do not have value.
This means that if the supply of deposits is positive, Et > 0, the exchange rate
must be εt =0 .W h e nIt+1 =1+θ, t ≥ 0, the households are indiﬀerent between
holding currency and deposits. We will assume that only currency is held, so that
Et =0 .
Cashless equilibria In an equilibrium where currency is not valued and only
deposits are used for transactions, the price level is Pt = Pe
t , and both the nominal
interest rate on deposits, I
f
t , and on bonds, It, are in units of deposits. There
is a unique such equilibrium, up to the determination of all nominal variables.
8The competitive equilibria where either only outside money or only inside money is valued
are deﬁned analogously.
10Furthermore there is no equilibrium where neither currency nor deposits are val-
ued.9 In the equilibrium with valued deposits, if the supply of currency is positive,
Mt > 0,t h e nεt = ∞. The incremental cost of the cash good is equal to the dif-
ference between the interest rate on bonds and the one on deposits, that is, the
intermediation cost, θ (i.e., It+1 − I
f
t+1 = θ, t ≥ 0).
In this economy with inside money, the nominal supply of deposits is in-
determinate. It follows that price levels are also indeterminate. The interest
rates are also indeterminate, but the diﬀerence between the two interest rates
is not, and that is what is relevant to determining the allocations. All of the
real quantities except the initial consumption of the cash good are determined by
u0(c2
t)=α;u0(c1
t+1)=α(1+θ) and nt = c2
t +c1





initial consumption is indeterminate if E0I
f
0 > 0.A s s u m i n gE0I
f
0 =0avoids this
indeterminacy without aﬀecting the characterization of equilibria from period one
on.10
3. Equilibria with commitment
In this section, we consider full commitment policies under the assumption that the
government chooses the policy ({Mt+1},{dt+1},{gt}) that maximizes its prefer-
ences for revenues (or transfers). More precisely, we assume that the government’s
problem is to maximize
P∞
t=0 β
tG(gt) (where, for standard reasons, the function
G is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave), subject to (2.10). Thus, given
that in equilibrium the gross real interest rate is constant and equal to β
−1,t h e
government will always choose a constant sequence of transfers. Therefore, the
value to the government of diﬀerent allocations can be measured in terms of g.
In the full commitment optimal program the value of the outstanding initial
money balances is zero, M0
P0 =0 . The choices of interest rates are likely to be
constrained by the presence of currency substitutes. To see this, notice that
without inside money competition, revenues from the inﬂation tax are given by
f(I)=( I−1)m(I). We assume that the function f(I) has a unique maximum I∗,
and that f0(I) > 0 for I∗ >I≥ 1 and f0(I) < 0 for I>I ∗. If, for example, u is of
9The formal treatment of the existence and non-uniqueness of monetary equilibria in
economies with inside money only is, to our knowledge, best performed by Drèze and Pole-
marchakis (2000).
10This cashless economy is not the limit of economies with well deﬁned currency demands, as
in Woodford (1998) and, therefore, it is not possible to determine the initial price level in our
cashless equilibrium as the limit of a sequence of equilibria with valued currency.
11the CRRA form then f satisﬁes these assumptions. It follows that an optimal plan
is stationary It+1 = I, t ≥ 0. Furthermore, whenever f0(1 + θ) ≥ 0, i.e., revenues
from the inﬂation tax are non-decreasing at 1+θ, the unconstrained choice of the
interest rate is greater than or equal to 1+θ. Inside money competition prompts
the government to choose I =1+θ. Condition (2.8) implies that I
f
t+1 =1 .M o r e
formally,
Proposition 1 Assume there exists I∗ > 1+θ such that f0(I) > 0 for I∗ >I≥ 1
and f0(I) < 0 for I>I ∗. Then, the commitment solution for the revenue
maximizing government is It+1 =1+θ, resulting in I
f
t+1 =1for t ≥ 0.
It follows as a corollary that as the intermediation costs are reduced (i.e.,
θ & 0) — for example, because the suppliers of currency substitutes become more
eﬃcient —, the commitment equilibrium approaches the Friedman rule, where the
rents to the monopolist supplier of currency are zero.
The commitment solution is time inconsistent. In this solution, at time zero,
the government runs a big open market operation holding real bonds issued by
the private sector that are exchanged for currency so that the real value of the
outstanding money stock is zero. In addition, monetary policy from time one on
is such that the gross nominal interest rate is constant over time and set at 1+θ.






,s ot h a t
if it was able to commit from time t on, it would be optimal to revise the plan
by setting Mt
Pt =0 , thereby conducting another big open market operation. The
interest rate plan It =1+θ will not necessarily be optimal for a government that
can decide sequentially. Therefore, we turn our attention to an economy without
a fully committed monetary authority.
4. Equilibria without commitment
In this section, we deﬁne and characterize equilibria when the government makes

























,for t ≥ 0.
12Given a history ht at the beginning of period t, the government moves ﬁrst and
chooses the policy for the period (gt,M t+1,d t+1).11 Thus, h1
t+1 is known within
period t, at the time households make their choices.
A sequential policy for the government is a sequence of functions σ = {σt}
∞
t=0,
where σt(ht) speciﬁes the choice of a government action (gt,M t+1,d t+1) as a func-
tion of the history ht. As in the commitment case, the government takes the
competitive behavior of the private sector as a given when choosing a policy. An
allocation rule for the private sector η is a sequence of functions {ηt}∞
t=0, where
ηt(h1
t+1) speciﬁes a one-period allocation for households and ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries (c1t,c 2t,n t,Md
t+1,E t+1,b h
t+1,b e
t+1) as a function of the history h1
t+1.I fσt(ht)
denotes the continuation of σ from ht, sequential rationality implies that for each
(t, ht),σt(ht) is optimal (i.e., maximizes transfer revenues subject to (2.10)) given
the allocation rules of the households.
A Sustainable Equilibrium (SE) is a pair (σ,η) such that: i) (σ,η) deﬁnes a








for each (t,ht), σt(ht) is optimal given η.
In order to characterize the set of sustainable equilibrium values, we ﬁrst need
to identify the worst one.
Proposition 2. The value of a competitive equilibrium where currency is not
held and deposits are used for transactions is the value of the worst sustain-
able equilibrium.
Proof. Let η be the allocation rule for the private sector corresponding to an
equilibrium where only inside money is valued (as deﬁned in Section 2). Let the
strategy of the government σ be given by Mt+1 =( 1+b µ)Mt, where (1+ b µ)β
−1 >
1+θ,d t = d0,g t = −(β
−1 − 1)d0, for all t. Currency is dominated and is not
held in the equilibrium deﬁned by (σ,η). Since currency is not valued, such a
policy is sequentially rational for the government. It follows that the value of this
equilibrium outcome, measured by the constant ﬂow of government transfers, is
V
WSE(d0)=−(β
−1 − 1)d0 (4.1)
where WSEstands for worst sustainable equilibrium. In fact the government can
always guarantee this payoﬀ, so that that there is no sustainable equilibrium with
a value lower than V WSE(d0).
11The implementation of the policy has to obey the timing of transactions spelled out in
Section 2 where good markets open ﬁrst and asset markets open at the end of the period, taken
from Svensson (1986).
13In line with Chari and Kehoe (1990), we apply Abreu (1988)’s optimal penal
codes and use the reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium as the means of
supporting equilibrium outcomes. As mentioned above, we will concentrate on
stationary equilibria, except for the initial big open market operation.
More explicitly, consider the following government strategy σ: M1 = BM0,
Mt+1 =( 1+µ
0





−1 − 1),a n ddt+1 = d1 =
d0 − βm(I
0), for all t ≥ 0, as long as Ms =( 1+µ0)Ms−1,f o r2 ≤ s ≤ t, and
M1 = BM0,w h e r eI0 =( 1+µ0)β
−1 ≤ 1+θ.I f M1 6= BM0,t h e nf o rt ≥ 1,
Mt+1 =( 1+b µ)Mt, gt = −d1(β
−1 − 1),a n ddt+1 = d1,w h e r e(1 + b µ)β
−1 > 1+θ;
and if Ms 6=( 1+µ0)Ms−1 for at least one s ≥ 2, then, for t ≥ s, Mt+1 =( 1+b µ)Mt,
gt = gs = −ds(β
−1−1),a n ddt+1 = ds,w h e r e(1+b µ)β
−1 > 1+θ.W ec o n s i d e rt h e
limiting equilibria as B →∞ .F o rI0 =1+θ, the limiting strategy corresponds to
following the policy achieved under full commitment (Proposition 1), as long as
such a full commitment path has been followed previously, while a deviation to an
inside money equilibrium -without cash, as in Proposition 2- follows if a deviation
from the full commitment path is observed.
As we have seen (Proof of Proposition 1), the value for the government after a
deviation is V WSE(dt). Therefore, it is not proﬁtable for the government to deviate
f r o mt h ep a t ho fc o n s t a n tg r o w t ho ft h em o n e ys u p p l yµ
0
if V (I0;dt) ≥ V WSE(dt),



















At t =0 , the value of the equilibrium with I
0, V (I
0;d0)=β(I0 − 1)m(I
0) − (1 −
β)d0β
−1 is always higher than V WSE(d0). V (I0;dt) ≥ V WSE(dt),f o ra l lt,o n l y
if βI0 − 1=π0 ≥ 0,w h e r eπ0 is the, constant, inﬂation rate when I0 is the gross
nominal interest rate.
So far, we have shown that sustainability requires the inﬂation rate to be
nonnegative.12 In addition, competition from currency substitutes requires I0 =
(1 + π0)β
−1 ≤ 1+θ. Thus, the set of (from period one) stationary sustainable
competitive outcomes with valued currency is characterized by inﬂation rates sat-
isfying
12If there was nominal debt, the corresponding lower bound on inﬂation rates would be stricly
positive.
140 ≤ π ≤ β (1 + θ) − 1 (4.2)
In the absence of competition from currency substitutes, the set of sustainable
equilibria is a very large one that includes the commitment solution, i.e. the
stationary inﬂation rate that allows achieving the maximum of the Laﬀer curve.
As long as that value is positive, the equilibrium is sustainable. The punishment is
autarchy, but from the perspective of a revenue maximizing government, autarchy
has the same value as the deposits-only equilibrium.
Competition reduces the set of sustainable inﬂation rates by imposing an upper
bound on equilibrium inﬂation when currency is valued. Thus, competition from
currency substitutes allows to reduce the maximum level of the inﬂation rate in a
sustainable equilibrium.
Because competition from currency substitutes reduces the future gains from
issuing currency, it is more diﬃcult to sustain equilibria where currency has value.
If the supply of currency substitutes is very eﬃcient, the set of sustainable equi-
libria with valued currency may be empty. That would be the case if, under
commitment, competition from currency substitutes drove the inﬂation rates into
negative numbers, which would happen if θ < β
−1 − 1. In that case, there would
be no sustainable equilibrium with valued currency but there would still be a sus-
tainable equilibrium outcome with deposits being used for transactions. In this
equilibrium, the cost of transactions is given by the real intermediation cost θ.
It follows that, with limited commitment, relatively less eﬃcient competitors can
drive currency out of circulation.
Proposition 3. The policy with full commitment (of Proposition 1), character-
ized by It+1 =1+θ, is sustainable if the intermediation cost θ satisﬁes
θ ≥ β
−1 − 1; i.e., if the equilibrium inﬂation rate is non-negative, π > 0.I f
θ < β
−1 − 1, there is no sustainable equilibrium with valued currency, but
there is a sustainable equilibrium with (only) inside money.
When the policy with full commitment is sustainable, the set of sustainable
equilibria can be relatively large although, as (4.2) shows, it shrinks with the
costs of supplying inside money. Eﬃciency is thus enhanced as these costs are
reduced, to the point where outside money is driven out of circulation. At this
point there would be a discrete loss of welfare, because of the use of a relatively
more costly technology to supply money. In turn, this cost would be minimized
as the inside-money technology becomes increasingly eﬃcient.
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In this section we show how the results we have obtained so far are modiﬁed
when we assume that the government maximizes welfare. As in the standard
Ramsey problem, we assume exogenous -per period- government expenditures, g.
As the ability to collect seigniorage will be limited by the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial
intermediaries, we allow for the government to levy consumption taxes, τt,a sw e l l
as taxes on the production of inside money, τe
t, to ensure that expenditures can
be ﬁnanced. In this paper we concentrate on the choice of monetary policy and
therefore we maintain full commitment on the choice of tax policy, in addition to
exogeneity of expenditures. We allow for monetary policy to be chosen with and
without commitment.
As in the previous section, the timing of events is as in Svensson (1985).
Nicolini (1998) shows that with this timing, the time inconsistency problem of a
Ramsey government is of a diﬀerent nature than in the classic papers of Calvo
(1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983), since there are costs of unanticipated inﬂa-
tion. The two main diﬀerences that this timing introduces are that the optimal
deviation for inﬂation is always ﬁnite and that for the government to be willing
to deviate from the Ramsey policy and inﬂate at a higher rate, the price elasticity
of consumption has to be larger than one. We will assume that this is indeed the
case. Nicolini (1998) obtains these results in an environment where seigniorage is
the sole source of revenue. In our set up there are alternative taxes which implies
that the optimal monetary policy is characterized by the Friedman rule. As we
show in this section, in our economy, when there is commitment to tax policy, the
monetary policy is time consistent.
The consumer’s problem is the same as before, except for the presence of a tax
on consumption. We simplify the analysis in this section by assuming preferences
of the form (2.1), but with the additional restriction of constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), i. e., −
u00(ct)ct
u0(ct) = ρ > 0), where 1/ρ is the price elasticity of ct.
For the reasons stated above, we assume that ρ < 1.I fεt = ε ∈ {0,1},t≥ 0, the
budget and cash-in-advance constraints are
Mt+1 +Ptb
h











t ≤ Mt + εtEt (5.2)
for t ≥ 0,M 0,R 0bh
0,E 0 =0given. Again, we assume that R0 = β
−1.
16The tax on consumption imposes a distortion between consumption and leisure,




=1+τt, t ≥ 0 (5.3)
As before, when currency has value, the marginal rate of substitution between the





= It+1 , t ≥ 0. (5.4)







t+1, t ≥ 0 (5.5)
Since there are consumption taxes the real value of deposits is Et
(1+τt)Pt.T h e
ﬁnancial intermediation technology is described by ne
t = θ Et
(1+τt)Pt.T h eﬁnancial
intermediaries pay a tax on time used to produce money, τe
t. Free entry in the










, t ≥ 0 (5.6)
If, as it will be shown to be the case, τe





=1+θ, t ≥ 0. (5.7)
5.1. Optimal policy under commitment
The optimal policy under commitment is the solution of a dynamic Ramsey prob-
lem, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983); like they did, we follow the primal approach.
The objective of the government is to maximize the welfare of the representative
household, subject to feasibility and other competitive equilibrium constraints.
These other competitive equilibrium constraints are consolidated in an imple-
mentability condition.
We ﬁrst consider the case where I
f
t+1 ≤ 1 and only currency is used for transac-
tions. The budget constraint of the households, from any period t ≥ 0 on, can be
17written as follows, provided that the cash-in-advance constraint is satisﬁed with






























This constraint, for t =0 ,s a t i s ﬁed with equality, together with (5.3) and (5.4),
can be used to build the following implementability condition, which is a necessary




















0 − αn0 − αd0β
−1 =0 (5.9)
We can now deﬁne the Ramsey problem as the maximization of the utility





t + g − nt ≤ 0, t ≥ 0. (5.10)
In the following proposition we characterize the Ramsey solution.
Proposition 4. Let the utility function u be CRRA and ρ < 1.T h e R a m s e y
solution is such that It+1 =1and τc





t+1 = cR,t≥ 0.
Proof. The result follows directly from the ﬁrst order conditions of the Ramsey


















We have set up the Ramsey problem assuming that the cash-in-advance con-







t ≥ 0.A t t h e R a m s e y o p t i m u m β Pt
Pt+1 = 1
It+1 =1 ,a n dτt = τR.T h et i m ez e r o
cash-in-advance constraint is satisﬁed with equality if c1
0 ≤ c1
1,w h i c hi st h ec a s e
provided ρ ≤ 1.
We have also assumed that the optimal policy resulted in I
f
t+1 ≤ 1. Suppose
that I
f
t+1 > 1, t ≥ 0. In that case only inside money circulates and the Ramsey
problem is the one in the cashless economy.
18The budget constraint of the households in the cashless economy after a devi-




























t =0 ,s i n c eEt =0 .F o rt =0 , this budget constraint and the ﬁrst order
conditions (5.5), (5.6), (5.3) can be summarized in the single implementability
condition, (5.9), together with c1





t + g − nt ≤ 0, t ≥ 0. (5.12)
The Ramsey problem is to maximize the utility function, subject to feasibility,
(5.12) and implementability, (5.9), with c1
0 =0 .
The solution is given by a constant consumption tax, τt = τ, t ≥ 0,a n db ya
tax on the production of money that equals the consumption tax, τe
t+1 = τt+1 = τ,





t+1) =1 + θ,f o rt ≥ 0 and c1
0 =0 . However, these marginal rates
of substitution and initial consumption were a feasible solution to the Ramsey
problem, as set up above, by choosing It+1 =1+θ (resulting in I
f
t+1 =1 )a n d





t+1 , and save on intermediation costs, relatively to a policy that
implies I
f
t+1 > 1. It follows that the Ramsey solution is such that I
f
t+1 ≤ 1, t ≥ 0,
so that currency substitutes will not be held, and only currency will be used for
transactions.
This proposition states that under commitment, a benevolent government will
follow the Friedman rule, It+1 =1 , t ≥ 0. The Friedman rule means that both
cash and credit goods, from period one on, are taxed at the same rate. This is
the optimal taxation solution since the utility function is homothetic in the two
goods and separable in leisure - which are the conditions for uniform taxation
of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), as highlighted by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1993). It also follows from standard optimal tax-
ation principles that, since the price elasticity is greater than one (ρ < 1), the
consumption in period 0 of the cash good is lower than the consumption from
period 1 on. That is, there is a higher tax on the initial cash good (with a price
elasticity of one).13
13See Nicolini (1998) for a further discussion of this.
19Under the Friedman rule the price level will be decreasing at the rate of time
preference, Pt+1 = βPt,t≥ 0. The following path for the money supply supports
the optimal allocation and prices: Mt+1 = βMt,t≥ 1,a n dM1 = β cR
cR
0 M0.N o t i c e
that the growth rate of money is higher at time zero than from time one on.
5.2. Optimal monetary policy without commitment
In this section we discuss the implications of relaxing the assumption that the
government is able to commit to monetary policy. We maintain the assumption
of commitment to ﬁscal policy while monetary policy is sequentially decided and
implemented. Such a regime is consistent with an institutional arrangement where
there exists a well developed commitment technology for ﬁscal policy (e.g., ﬁscal
policies are infrequently revised and have to be approved by parliaments), while
that may not be the case for monetary policy. As we will see, once the government
is committed to an optimal ﬁscal policy, there are no incentives for the monetary
policy to deviate from the optimal Friedman rule. The reason is that government
expenditures and alternative tax revenues are determined in period zero, and,
furthermore, the monetary authority can not reduce revenues in future periods.
Thus, it has no incentive to increase revenues either. The following proposition
states the time consistency of monetary policy.
Proposition 5 Assume that the government can commit to tax policy. Then,
monetary policy is time consistent.
Proof. In each period t ≥ 1, the problem of a government that considers revising








































and subject to the restriction that the nominal interest rate is non-negative. Given
(5.4), the latter restriction can be written as c1
t+s ≤ cR.L e tϕt+s be the multipliers
20of these constraints and γ, the multiplier of the implementability condition. Then















α + γ + ϕt+s
1+
γ
α [1 − ρ]
, s ≥ 1
If the constraint that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative is not binding,





t), s ≥ 1. Therefore
c1
t <c 1




− α > 0, s ≥ 0,t h e r ea r e
no incentives to deviate from the full commitment path with c1
t+s = cR, s ≥ 0.
Similarly, if -as it is the case— the zero bound constraint is binding, so that c1
t+s =
cR, s ≥ 1, in order to satisfy the budget constraint it must be that c1
t ≤ cR.I t
follows that c1
t = cR. Since there are no incentives to deviate from period t ≥ 1
on, the Ramsey policy is time consistent.
6. Concluding Remarks
The development of electronic payment systems has drastically reduced interme-
diation costs for the banking system, making inside money a closer substitute for
outside money. Somewhat surprisingly, little attention has been paid to how those
developments may aﬀect the conduct of monetary policy. This paper sheds light
on this and related issues.
We have shown that inside money competition may enhance eﬃciency, and
that would certainly be the case if the provision of increasingly eﬃcient inside
money would compete with a fully committed central bank aiming at maximizing
revenues. In this case, lower costs of producing inside money drive down inﬂation
rates and, in the zero-cost limit, the Friedman rule is implemented. There are
however two main qualiﬁcations to the view that inside-outside money competition
works as standard product competition.
The ﬁrst qualiﬁcation is that competitive pressure may be exercised as an in-
terplay between two forms of ineﬃciency; between the ineﬃciency of using costly
produced inside money and the ineﬃciency generated by pursuing sequential mon-
etary policies when there is limited commitment. This is the case when a revenue
maximizer central bank can not commit to future interest rates. As the supply of
inside money becomes increasingly eﬃcient, equilibrium inﬂation rates are driven
down to the point where the inﬂationary rents supporting valued currency vanish,
21and the more eﬃcient -even if more costly— inside money drives outside money
out.
The second qualiﬁcation is that the competitive pressure from inside money
may be irrelevant when there is a benevolent government that delegates the im-
plementation of monetary policy maintaining full commitment to ﬁscal policy. In
this context monetary policy is eﬃcient and time consistent. A Ramsey govern-
ment chooses the Friedman rule with full commitment and, therefore, there is no
disciplinary role for inside money competition. It turns out that such eﬃcient
policy is time consistent when there is commitment to ﬁscal policy. The time
consistency of the Friedman rule results from the fact that there is no incentive
to raise initial revenues, when the zero bound on interest rates does not allow for
revenues to be reduced in the future. It follows that, even without commitment,
there is no disciplinary role for inside money competition.
Although we do not analyze it in this paper, it should be clear that if the
Ramsey solution implies an inﬂationary policy -for example, if seigniorage has to
be collected because other taxes are not available— or if there is no commitment to
a tax policy, then the Friedman rule is no longer time-consistent and inside money
competition may aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. In particular, in our economies
the loss of conﬁdence on outside money, following a deviation of the monetary
authority, is characterized by a shift to a cashless economy. Since the technological
inferiority of the inside money determines the welfare in the cashless economy, it
follows that inside money competition would determine the sustainability of the
Ramsey policy in these contexts.
Can the observed increased eﬃciency in the provision of currency substitutes
justify the low inﬂation rates in most developed economies in the last two decades?
Possibly, as we have seen, but then we should also be aware that the pressure for
low inﬂation rates can threat the value of currency. We have also learnt that low
inﬂation rates can also be the outcome of properly motivated and designed ﬁscal
and monetary institutions, even when the latter are allowed to make discretionary
choices.
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